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Section 1: Introduction 
Innovation and the diffusion of related knowledge has been a key driver of growth 
throughout the world for centuries, particularly since the industrial revolution. 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs), such as patents, were developed as an institution to 
promote research and development (R&D) by protecting the investments of 
innovators through temporary exclusive rights to manufacture and sell a patented 
invention. The arrangement is meant to be mutually beneficial to the innovator and 
society as a whole. In exchange for disclosing the details of a new invention to the 
public domain, which allows for the diffusion of related technical knowledge, the 
innovator receives a 20-year monopoly on the sale, manufacture and distribution of 
the invention. Not only is this meant to increase the incentive for new R&D, but also 
to ensure that new disruptive innovations are not lying dormant due to the inventor’s 
lack of resources or will to manufacture it. However, the increasing complexity of 
innovations, especially in the high-tech and software industries, has led to ambiguous 
boundaries in patent protection. Business methods and software patents are 
particularly troublesome because 100% of the patentable “invention” lies within 
abstract ideas implemented in code and subsequently explained in a patent claim. 
Unclear boundaries create legal uncertainties and there is growing evidence of 
companies taking advantage of these unclear boundaries willingly through patent 
monetization entities (PME) and strategic patenting. These types of activities create 
uncertainty in the marketplace and raise the barriers for market entry, therefore 
creating a disincentive to invest. This article will explore the characteristics of the 
contemporary institutional environment of IPRs in the United States in an attempt to 
identify some causal factors for the rapid expansion of incidences of patent litigation 
and the ensuing market uncertainty that follows through the usage of descriptive 
statistics and case study methodology.   
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1 is the introduction and definitions. 
Section 2 will cover a brief history of patent litigation in the United States. After 
shortly covering two patent crises in the 19th century and their causes, Section 2 will 
continue with major benchmarks in patent legislation in recent decades. Finally the 
section will conclude with discussing the inherent issues of software patents and the 
typical PME case type. Section 3 will be focused primarily on the theoretical 
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framework of the article, including the origins of property rights theory, the effects of 
market uncertainty on investment, the nuisance suit economic model, and the effect of 
PMEs on innovation.  Section 4 is where the methodology of the article is discussed, 
complimented by the help of descriptive statistics. Benefits and limitations of case 
study methodology are covered, as well as any possible biases in the data. Section 5 is 
comprised of four separate case studies within separate patent classes, three of which 
are from the software and high-tech industries. Finally Section 6, the conclusion, will 
reiterate the main points of the paper and discuss the findings.  
 
1.1 Research Question 
What are some ways that PMEs are contributing to the increase in litigation and legal 
uncertainty in the current institutional environment of IPRs in the United States? 
 
1.2 Definitions 
It would be difficult to hold a discussion about IPR policy in present day context 
without the term “patent troll” being mentioned. However, regardless of which side 
one lands on the IPR patent litigation issue, it is hard to deny the negative connotation 
that comes with the term troll. Other more neutral terms, such as non-practicing entity 
or patent assertion entity, have been proposed as alternatives but might be a little too 
broad for the sake of this article. By definition, a non-practicing entity (NPE) is 
literally any patent holder that does not manufacture the patent that they possess. 
While this does indeed include the population that this article is wishing to include, it 
also includes single inventors and start-ups that are wishing to transfer their 
technology to manufacturers for a licensing fee. These groups of people are not part 
of the problem that this article is attempting to address, as they are utilizing the patent 
system as it was intended to be used, as a means to transfer technology, promote 
innovation, and protect the investment of the inventor. Another term, patent assertion 
entity, which has gained popularity recently, includes a population of entities that use 
patents to assert them against businesses already using the technology in order to 
attain licensing fees. While this is closer to the definition the author is searching for, 
the clever wording has allowed some entities, such as the RPX Corporation, to mask 
the true characterization of itself through using third parties. For example, RPX is a 
for-profit corporation that buys broad or poor quality patents and, for a monthly fee, 
will license out their patents. RPX’s entire vision is claimed to protect business 
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through a sort of crowd funding operation to buy up poor quality patents and RPX 
vows to never assert them against anyone. However, RPX sells their patents to a third 
party who has no restrictions on patent assertion outside of RPX’s customer base. So 
if all parties are included, RPX is indirectly a patent assertion entity in itself as a 
conglomerate (Jeruss, Feldman & Walker 2012). Due to this, hereinafter this article 
will refer to entities that monetize patents, in any way, without actually performing 
any technology transfer as patent monetization entities (PMEs). It has been noted in 
relevant literature that universities have in the past been included into NPE, PAE, or 
PME categorizations but for the sake of this paper universities will be left out as they 
include only 0.2% of all patent litigation and therefore are not of significant relevance 
(ibid.). In order to clarify, this study is not interested in patent litigation between two 
manufacturers, such as Apple and Samsung, as the current system in place is a 
disincentive to frivolous lawsuits by competing manufacturers due to high costs for 
both parties in legal fees, manufacturing delays, and counter-suits.  
 
Section 2.  Literature Review: A History of Patents in the US. 
The USPTO was established in 1793 and within the first century of its enactment 
there were two events with striking similarities to contemporary times that led to 
diminishing public opinion of patents and almost caused the dismissal of the entire 
patent system (Granstrand 2006). This section will cover events that happened in the 
agriculture and railroad industries, during the end of the 19th century to illustrate the 
similar nature of PME activity in contemporary times. Moreover, some major 
benchmarks in contemporary patent legislation will be discussed to give further 
contextual knowledge to the development chronology of nuisance patent litigation 
and PME activity. 
 
2.1 Patent Sharks in the Agricultural and Railroad Industries 
The establishment of the USPTO is regarded as playing a crucial role in setting up an 
institutional environment that helped transform an infant nation into the industrial 
powerhouse it had become merely a century later. The potential of the new market 
awoke schemers and con men to apply for patents on prior art in attempts to receive 
easy money. Initially this plan worked because under the first set of patent laws, all 
applications were approved and any conflicts had to be taken up in court (Usselman & 
John 2006). Similarly to contemporary times, litigation defense was a costly matter 
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200 years ago, and the patent holders would adjust licensing fees to be less than the 
cost of defense, therein making a settlement the most economical decision regardless 
of the patent’s merit. Unfortunately, this problem is one that has not entirely been 
addressed in the modern judicial system and will be explained further in a nuisance 
patent economic model. This issue of universal application granting was finally 
addressed by the USPTO in 1836, which left the conflict portion of patents with the 
courts but the USPTO took on the initial responsibility of deeming whether a patent is 
novel, non-obvious, and should be approved (Merges 2009). The real shock that led to 
crises in two major industries and almost led to the downfall of the entire patent 
system due to unpopular demand came down to an amendment of a single word. In 
1869, the USPTO decided to allow incremental improvements of current patents to be 
patentable by extending the range of design patents from “new and original” to “new, 
useful, and original” (Chien 2012). This alteration of one word opened the floodgates 
for the opportunists once again, and a tsunami of new patent applications washed into 
the USPTO. The majority of these patents were for everyday farming tools, such as 
spades, rakes, and seed planters. Undoubtedly, the reason for this is at least half of the 
American economy at this time was still involved in the agricultural sector and these 
tools were what were most common to the majority and minor improvement ideas 
were apparently not in short supply. It has been reported that an ordinary corn planter 
had 647 patents, a corn sheller had 378, and all of the different parts of a plow totaled 
6,211 patents (ibid.). Drawing another parallel to contemporary times, the patents 
were typically applied for and retained by inventors, or in this case mostly farmers, 
who would then sell the patents to lawyers and technocrats that had the knowledge 
and capital to assert the patents against others (Magliocca 2003). Once this type of 
activity gained momentum and everyday farmers were being hit with the choice of 
licensing fees or lawsuits over using the same tools that they had been using for 
decades, a grassroots resistance within the agricultural sector arose that threatened the 
patent system.	  	  
 
During the same period of time, initiated by the 1869 USPTO amendment, the 
railroad industry experienced an enormous surge of patents on different parts of a 
train. The sudden influx of applications caused a significant increase of the patent 
backlog, which was addressed by the USPTO by increasing success rates of 
applications (Usselman & John 2006). During this era, the railroad was the epitome of 
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technology and once word of this exploitable market got out, patent speculators began 
patenting parts ranging from double-acting air brakes, to sleeper cars or safety 
equipment (Gallagher 2011). In defense, the railroad industry bound together through 
the Eastern and Western Railroad Associations through hiring patent attorneys and 
lobbying Congress to address the issue (Chien 2012). The fundamental strategy of 
patent litigation during this period parallels contemporary PME procedures.   
 
2.2 Contemporary Patent History  
It has been argued that the contemporary problem of the surge in patent applications 
and ultimately a rapid increase in patent litigation began in 1984 with the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) deciding to exclusively hear patent disputes, 
in order to specialize and fully understand the complex conflicts. Before this event, 
patent disputes tended to favor the defendant, but after this incident the courts began 
siding much more commonly with the plaintiffs (patent holder) and damage awards 
dramatically increased simultaneously (Granstrand 2006). Patent protection was 
extended to software in 1994, which was formerly only allowed copyright protection, 
when the CAFC ruled that software was eligible for patentability as long as its utility 
was, “…a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result” (Sterne 
& Bugaisky 1994). In 1995 the largest international IPR agreement occurred with the 
Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which 
linked international trade to international IPR protection. This strengthened the power 
of patent holders as it allowed for their patents to be enforced to a further extent in 
foreign countries. The TRIPS agreement has received much criticism for having a 
“developed” country bias and has been accused as hindering a virtuous catch-up cycle 
for developing countries (Forero-Pineda 2006). Regardless of the validity of those 
claims, it is apparent that the relative strength of IPR and patent holders became 
stronger after TRIPS, which presumably contributed to the rise in patent applications 
in recent decades. Finally, one of the main enabling decisions leading to the rise in 
nuisance patent litigation comes from the 1998 decision in State Street Bank and 
Trust v. Signature Financial Group where it was ruled that business methods were 
patentable as long as they were incorporated into some sort of software (ibid.). While 
this did not have an immediate effect, as e-commerce had not yet fully developed and 
the diffusion of knowledge about the settlement took time to disperse. Around a 
decade after this decision, it is shown that this specific class of patents, Class 705, has 
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begun to take flight (See Figure 1). The relevance of this particular patent class will 
be discussed further in this section. 
 
	  
Figure	  1 
 
2.3 What is the problem with software patents?  
As mentioned in Section 1, an idea is not enough in itself to warrant patent protection. 
A patentable invention needs to have clear boundaries that can be understood and 
replicated by a third party. By definition, abstract ideas and algorithms are not 
patentable on their own but that is essentially what software patents are. With the 
additional business method patents being allowed after 1998, which merely required 
that a business introduces a new method of doing business (e-commerce, insurance, 
retail, banking, etc.) integrated within software, a dramatic increase in software 
patents has occurred along with the number of patent lawsuits per year. With business 
methods becoming patentable, it became entirely possible to patent abstract ideas 
without a tangible invention. The issue with an entirely abstract patent is that patent’s 
need to have clearly defined boundaries, as to only cover the extent of the invention 
being patented. With abstract ideas, boundaries can easily become unclear and often 
times certain words have multiple embodiments that could make a claim’s boundaries 
interpretable in several different ways. As a result, certain abstract patents violate the 
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technology than what was actually invented (Bessen & Meurer 2008). While not all 
software patents break this rule, the technology itself facilitates the potential for 
abstract claiming and statistics are showing that more people are taking advantage of 
this potential. All of the top 12 patent classes asserted by patent monetizers are 
software related. It has been estimated that software patents are litigated seven to ten 
times more often than average patents (Allison et al. 2012). Patent Class 705 
(business methods) is ranked third most litigated with 128 patents and 844 defendants 
(RPX Corp. 2012, see Figure 2). In 2012, out of all the NPE cases filed, 92% of them 
were filed by PMEs and only 5% by inventors (ibid). This rapid acceleration of patent 
lawsuits within the software industry leads one to believe that this loophole in IPR 
legislation has significant economic values and more economic actors are jumping on 
the bandwagon each year. Interestingly enough, some researchers have found that 
most of those in the software industry itself are against software patents, and software 
companies are more often defendants rather than plaintiffs in patent lawsuits (Oz 
1998). 
 
After potentially vague boundaries of software patents, it could be argued that notice 
failure is the next largest issue for software and high-tech patents. Notice failure is 
when patent infringers do so unknowingly due to not being aware that a certain 
technology is already patented. In certain industries, such as chemical, notice failure 
is not nearly as much of an issue because there is no disputing the boundaries of a 
chemical compound and a quick Google search will notify the searcher if a compound 
is patented or not. With software and high-tech industries this is not the case at all- the 
iPhone has reportedly over 250,000 patents for all of its different components (Chien 
2012). Despite the fact that only a tiny fraction of those patents will ever be enforced 
or asserted on other mobile phone manufacturers, these “patent thickets” make it 
nearly impossible to know if a they are infringing on a patent and exactly which ones 
they are infringing on until after the manufacturer has invested into the technology or 
have started production and a cease and desist letter arrives in their mailbox.  It is 
common strategy for PMEs to wait until an “infringed” technology is fully embedded 
into a product before requesting licensing fees or suing a defendant because the 
defendant will be more committed to the current path and more likely to settle out of 
court (Bessen & Meurer 2008).  
 
     
	   9	  
	  
Figure	  2	  	  
2.4 What does a typical PME case look like?  
In 2012, the top 10 patent litigators comprised 30% of all PME lawsuits (RPX Corp. 
2012). These patent aggregators are normally businesses comprised merely of a legal 
team and accountants that actively scour the patent logs for weakly defined or overly 
broad patents that could be exploited or asserted for financial gain. These PME’s do 
not actually manufacture anything and their main revenue stream is from obtaining 
licensing fees or winning settlements in court. As will be shown in the nuisance suit 
economic model in Section 3, the fact that PME’s do not manufacture their own 
patents gives them a substantial advantage over manufacturers because the defendants 
do not have the opportunity to file counter-suits as a defensive tactic to drive up the 
legal costs of patent assertion. For example, if Apple frivolously sues Samsung over a 
weak patent and interrupts production at Samsung, or at the very least costs Samsung 
significant legal fees for a weak patent, then Samsung can file a counter-suit with 
their own patent portfolio and apply the same strategy back on Apple (Graham & 
Vishnubhakat 2013). The legal frameworks creates a sort of equilibrium that 
disincentivizes Apple from initially bringing suit, as everyone is on the same playing 
field, unless they have a legitimate claim that they are confident can and should win.    
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However, from a PME’s cost-benefit standpoint in regards to time as well as capital, 
it is more beneficial for the them to settle for a licensing fee than take the case to 
court. Some reasons for this are that licensing fees are always a win for the PME 
because their balance sheet is positive and their patent is not at risk. Even if the 
potential settlement is very high for a given patent, there is always the chance that if 
taken to court a judge could rule against the plaintiff and nullify the patent, making it 
void and useless in subsequent lawsuits. So for this reason, the business model for 
PMEs is typically to sell as many licenses as possible without having to go to court. 
This strategy greatly influences a PMEs selection of defendants as larger corporations 
have more expendable capital and/or dedicated legal teams in order to defend 
themselves and are therefore more likely to challenge an infringement claim instead 
of paying a licensing fee (Rivette & Kline 2000). Over half (63%) of the new 
defendants added in 2012 were from companies with less than $100M in revenue. 
Also, patent assertion is not limited to producers or manufacturers, and there have 
been several cases where users of software were sued for using patented software, 
despite the fact that they had nothing to do with creating the software in question 
(Bessen & Meurer 2008). The median total cost of litigation defense for 
small/medium companies is $318,000 and $646,000 for large companies (Bessen & 
Meurer 2014).  
 
Section 3. Theory 
 
3.1 Why are property rights necessary? 
It seems appropriate to begin with a basic foundation of property rights theory in 
order to simplify the understanding of intellectual property rights (IPR) development 
in the United States. As technology has advanced, the legal boundaries of patents 
have become more abstract and harder to define. Jumping into contemporary IPR 
issues without understanding the basis of property rights theory and patent history 
runs the risk of misinterpreting the reality of the current IPR institutional 
environment. Douglass North has argued for decades over the importance of property 
rights as a crucial institution for economic growth to reduce transaction costs and 
promote commerce (North 1990). Strong property rights are not independent of other 
institutions and are linked to others such as social capital and rule of law. Joseph 
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Mahoney (2004) argues that there are three important prerequisites for the efficiency 
of property rights,  
(1) universality – all scarce resources are owned by someone;  
(2) exclusivity – property rights are exclusive rights;  
(3) transferability – to ensure that resources can be allocated from low to high 
yield uses.  
(Mahoney 2004) 
The exclusivity and transferability of property rights are meant to promote investment 
and increase efficiency, which is a pretty straightforward concept. However, since the 
industrial revolution the increased mechanization of the world created a demand for 
intellectual property to be also covered under a property rights institution. High-tech 
machinery and tools took large investments to develop and the innovators needed 
some guarantee that their investment would be protected from counterfeiters and 
reverse engineering. Unlike physical property, IPR is a non-rival good, meaning more 
than one person can use it at a time. Due to this, the exclusivity variable of property 
rights needed to be adjusted to fit IPR. The solution was to enable patent holders to 
legally be able to exclude others from the use of their patents, enforceable through 
civil litigation. Giving an exclusive monopoly over an idea can be a powerful 
economic asset, and with the primary focus of the USPTO being on promoting 
economic growth and innovation, novelty and non-obviousness requirements were 
placed upon patent applications to avoid giving exclusivity rights without just cause. 
However, an idea alone is not sufficient enough to warrant patent protection. While a 
prototype is not needed in order to receive a patent, a detailed description of the 
invention must be sufficient enough that a person could read the patent application 
and utilize the information to manufacture a product (USPTO 2012). Due to the 
scalability potential of a monopoly on an idea, a new market opportunity emerged if 
one was able to receive a poor quality (broad or abstract) patent, which could legally 
be leveraged to seek rents without providing any real innovation (Merges 2009).  
 
There are two sides to every story, and proponents of PME’s and software patents 
argue that they have merely realized a viable market opportunity and seized it. 
However, just because a market exists does not mean that it is facilitating innovation 
and has any social benefit. The aim of the IPR system in the US and throughout the 
world is to achieve a net positive social benefit for society to promote growth in 
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economies as a whole. In The Problem of Social Cost (1960), Robert Coase examines 
several incidences where businesses incur some form of social cost on society, such 
as a factory polluting a river, and the course of action taken to resolve the altercation. 
In such a situation, Coase argues that the polluting firm should not automatically be 
punished for incurring a social or environmental cost, but rather an analysis should be 
conducted regarding if the social benefit of the factories output is greater than the 
negative effects of the pollution (Coase 1960). This example may not be an ample 
choice in contemporary times as altercations such as this are highly politicized, but in 
another more socially neutral case, Coase discusses two radio stations battling over 
the same frequency. Due to interference, it is disruptive to both radio stations to 
broadcast over the same frequency. According to Coase, if transaction costs are low 
enough, the initial allocation of property rights (the radio frequency) to a certain radio 
station does not matter, because the more efficient (popular) station will then pay the 
less efficient station to switch frequencies (ibid.). Therefore, the Coase theorem states 
that initial property rights allocation is irrelevant and the market will sort out the most 
efficient solution as long as transaction costs are low. 
 
The problem of social cost is that it is one of reciprocal nature. If group A were 
harming group B, to avoid the harm group B would have to harm group A. The 
question remaining is which group should be allowed to harm the other? Which 
would induce the lowest social cost? (ibid.). In relation to IPRs, if a person or firm 
patents a novel innovation and receives exclusive property rights, the loser or the 
harmed would be any competing firm, but the societal effect would be positive as 
efficiency would increase in the industry, ultimately resulting in better quality and/or 
lower prices therein boosting the economy. Institutional tools such as FRAND (Fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing) agreements coupled with low 
transaction costs, according to the Coase theorem, should reduce the importance of 
the initial allocation of a certain property right or patent. In reality, however, the 
emergence of patent fragmentation has caused transaction prices to rise. High-tech 
gadgets such as smartphones have hundreds of thousands of patents within a single 
phone, and the fragmentation of intellectual ownership rights can make license 
bargaining a complex and exhausting endeavor. In a study on market for innovation 
through the settlement of patent disputes, Galasso and Schankerman conclude that:  
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 Delay and uncertainty in the settlement and licensing process mean slower 
diffusion of patented technology. Moreover, longer delays would typically be 
associated with higher transaction costs for the negotiating parties. 
(Galasso & Schankerman 2010) 
Due to the rising transaction costs and relative advantage of patent holders, it has 
become common practice for firms to aggregate as many patents as possible for both 
offensive and defensive purposes. This, in turn, only perpetuates the increase of 
transaction costs and as a result commerce has nearly reached a point analogous with 
the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. Strategic patenting and patent aggregation to 
ensure a firm’s own assets have resulted in a confusing web of property rights 
weaving through all facets of industry.   
 
3.2 Market uncertainty effects on investment 
The link between market uncertainty and investment is not ambiguous. Investors seek 
positive returns on their investments and when the market is uncertain, the most 
common course of action is to wait until the market stabilizes or new factors increase 
the probability of returns. Investment in R&D is commonly viewed as an irreversible 
investment, as much of the capital goes towards the salaries of the researchers 
(Czarnitzki & Toole 2011). According to real options theory, greater uncertainty 
reduces the incentive of investing irreversible capital by relatively increasing the 
value of waiting to invest (Pindyck 1991). Patent protection can be a powerful tool to 
mitigate uncertainty on a firm’s R&D decision, as exclusive rights rule out much of 
the threat of competition, at the very least generating licensing fees for the patent 
holder. Although, the mitigating effect is contingent on, “…patenting being an 
effective means of market protection. As one would expect, patent protection does not 
mitigate the effect of uncertainty in industries where patents are ineffective” 
(Czarnitzki & Toole 2001). In order to test this claim, it is important to first 
understand which industries are most problematic. Software and business methods 
patents have commonly been characterized as having the potential for being of poor 
quality due to their inherent abstract nature (Hall 2010). While Galasso and 
Schankerman (2010) hypothesized that higher fragmentation of patent rights would 
increase transaction costs, when they empirically tested their claim, they chose to 
analyze within the biomedical industry. Their major error in choosing that industry is 
that the biomedical industry is efficient in determining property boundaries, so there 
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is no room for debate over the extent of patent protection. If the study were re-
administered in an inefficient patent industry such as software or business methods, 
the result would presumably be different.   
 
In high-tech industries, including software, innovation is often cumulative and firms 
resolve patent disputes through cross-licensing agreements and patent pools. In order 
to be a part of one of these cooperative mechanisms, a firm must have patents to offer 
in return for receiving another firm’s license or a royalty fee agreement must be 
settled. While FRAND agreements exist to keep royalties at a reasonable rate, they 
are only applicable to standard setting organizations, which result to only a fraction of 
total patents (Layne-Farrar et al. 2007). Due to the apparent pro-patent status of the 
judicial system in the post-1982 era, the relative patent premium (value added from 
patenting) has been rising and firms have begun to take notice. Evidence of this is 
seen in firms implementing strategic patenting schemes. In such cumulative 
industries, fragmented property rights can be destructive for innovation, as firms need 
to be able to secure the licensing rights of complimentary technologies before moving 
ahead with R&D (Noel & Schankerman 2006). This issue, dubbed the problem of the 
anti-commons, creates an incentive for firms to develop defensive patent strategies, 
which normally consists of accumulating patents to use as bargaining chips to 
preserve their freedom to operate (Heller and Eisenberg 1998). This problem is 
exacerbated in the software industry, partly due to notice failure and fuzzy 
boundaries, and the result is patent thickets, multiple patents on the same technology 
and a race to preemptively patent new technology before any competitors. The 
marginal benefit of patenting in high-tech industries has been rising 
disproportionately to the marginal cost of applying for the patents, and as the 
industries becomes more fragmented the relative value of patents goes up, therein 
perpetuating the cycle (Bloom et al. 2007). From strictly an economic standpoint, this 
preemptive nature of high-tech industries skews the traditional system of deciding 
when to invest, ultimately resulting in inefficient investments.  
 The optimal point to invest should balance the profits foregone by delaying the 
investment against the option value relinquished when the investment is made. This 
leads to a decision rule under which an investment is made when its net present value 
(NPV) is strictly positive.  
(Hsu & Lambrecht 2007) 
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It has been suggested that in industries where preemption and first move advantages 
are the norm, the potential for delaying investments may be limited. This type of 
environment encourages speculative patenting and investment before the relevant 
technology is fully developed, often leading to poor quality patents with unclear or 
excessively broad boundaries (Weeds 2002). The increasing relative power of patent 
holders and the growing utility of patents being used as bargaining chips to deter high 
transaction costs incurred by litigation has created a reinforcing environment that has 
helped fuel the surge of patents in high-tech and software industries. However, while 
greater patent fragmentation results in more R&D and patenting by the firm, it also 
lowers market value due to higher transaction costs. Furthermore it has been 
suggested that the current level of patenting is socially inefficient and impedes 
cumulative innovation in complex industries with fragmented patent ownership (Noel 
& Schankerman 2006).   
 
3.3 Nuisance Suit Economic Model 
There are several models describing the economic incentives to filing a nuisance suit, 
but the clearest and most concise model comes from Ranganath Sudarshan’s (2008) 
article Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal. In this 
model, the Plaintiff is a PME that does not produce any commercial product, but 
merely is asserting their patent against a producer, the Defendant, who allegedly 
infringed on a patent. In his own words, the variables for the model can be defined as 
such: 
 
 V:  The maximum amount of damages that Plaintiff can hope to 
reap from Defendant for infringement of Plaintiffs patent. 
 
p:  The probability (O<p<l) that both a) Plaintiffs patent will 
withstand Defendant's challenges to the patent's validity, 
and b) Defendant infringes Plaintiff s patent.  
 
Cp:  Plaintiffs prospective cost of litigation, including 
attorney's fees, court costs, expert fees, internal litigation 
costs, etc. 
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Cd:  Defendant's prospective cost of litigation, including 
attorney's fees, court costs, expert fees, internal litigation 
costs, etc. 
 
NS:  The nuisance amount which Plaintiff can offer Defendant to 
resolve/prevent litigation 
(Sudarshan 2008) 
 
When looking from the Plaintiffs perspective, it is economically beneficial to bring a 
suit against the Defendant if: 
1. Cp < pV 
In other words, if the expected probability of winning a lawsuit multiplied by the 
amount of projected damages awarded is higher than the cost of litigation fees, then it 
would be economically beneficial to file a nuisance suit. From the perspective of the 
Defendant, the threat of a suit is expected to have the value (or loss) of: 
2. p(V+Cd) + (1-p)(Cd) 
Therefore in order for a settlement or license amount to be worthwhile for the 
Defendant, it must only be less than the expected value of the suit in equation #2. This 
distorts the value of holding a patent because the value of NS does not reflect the 
potential worth of infringing on a patent, but rather the cost of the Defendant to fight a 
lawsuit. Herein lies one of the fundamental problems with the contemporary patent 
system, even if the Plaintiff has a p value of nearly 0, meaning that their probability of 
winning the case is almost impossible, the Cd costs are still applicable to the 
Defendant, allowing the possibility of a NS settlement to occur as long as it is less 
than the amount in equation #2, or rather the cost of Cd. Furthermore, there is an array 
of tactics that can be utilized by the Plaintiff to raise the costs of Cd, which would 
subsequently raise the value of NS, therein giving higher returns for the Plaintiff. 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), discovery requests can be made 
regarding anything that may reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
(Sudarshan 2008). The Plaintiff can exploit the aforementioned article of the FRCP by 
making excessive discovery requests to the Defendant. The Defendant is bound under 
penalty of the court to produce evidence requested by the Plaintiff, which often times 
is very costly and time consuming to produce, directly increasing Cd costs. Another 
tactic to raise Cd costs is to add subsequent infringement claims on other irrelevant 
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patents held in the portfolio of the Plaintiff as long as they are remotely relevant and 
fulfill the FRCP article 11 requirements (FRCP 2014).  Finally another tactic to raise 
Cd costs is to file the suit in a jurisdiction that is inconvenient for the Defendant. The 
Plaintiff has the option of placing the jurisdiction where the Defendant resides or in 
any jurisdiction where the Defendant has “committed acts of infringement”, so it is 
not uncommon for Plaintiffs to choose “magnet jurisdictions” that are most favorable 
for the Plaintiff and inconvenient for the Defendant, raising Cd costs for travelling 
and litigating in a distant location (Sudarshan 2008). 
 
The plaintiffs of nuisance suits also have certain methods to decrease their own 
litigation costs, which therefore increases the number of suits they can bring with the 
same amount of money. One method is to employ lawyers that work with a 
contingency fee arrangement; meaning that the Plaintiff does not need to pay for the 
costs of litigation upfront, and the fees will only be paid if the case is won or a 
favorable settlement is awarded. In this type of scenario, lawyers often take a higher 
percentage of the profits when litigation is successful to cover the costs of when their 
efforts fail, so in order to maximize profits, a scale economy approach is usually taken 
by the Plaintiffs in the form of filing as many lawsuits as possible (Bessen et al. 
2014). As has been demonstrated throughout this paper insofar, the Plaintiff seems to 
have a formidable advantage in regards to leverage over the Defendant in patent 
infringement litigation.  
 
The submarine patent is a strategy that was legislatively addressed in 2000 but is still 
relevant in cases today. Before 2000, details of a patent application were not 
published until after the patent was approved and it became a strategy to intentionally 
delay the approval of a patent in order to retain secrecy and extend the length of 
patent protection. The protection is extended because the applicant will wait until the 
technology that they are patenting blossoms and becomes widely implemented by 
other companies, and then the applicant can suddenly appear, get their patent 
approved and receive royalties due to their early filing date (Bell 2013). With the 
TRIPS agreement in 1995, patent protection was changed from 17 years after 
acceptance to 20 years from filing date, and even though this reduced the incentives 
for submarine patent behavior, it did not abolish the problem (Primo Braga et al. 
2000). Submarine patents are able to exist because often times patents are not 
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approved because of clerical error in the application or one of the requirements is not 
fulfilled, but since the USPTO would like to avoid disenfranchising inventors of their 
own patents due to a small mistake, it allows some opportunists to take advantage of 
this loophole and intentionally delay a patents approval (Bell 2013).  
 
3.4 Effect of PMEs on Innovation  
IPRs are designed to increase innovation through incentivizing research and 
development and protecting the investment of the inventor. If an inventor does not 
have the resources to exploit their technology, then they can sell the patent or license 
its use out to the free market and society as a whole will benefit from it. This is the 
one of the main intended functions of the USPTO and IPR laws. The difference with 
PMEs is that they often rely on broad or vague patents that cover a wider range of 
technology than was initially intended because of clever language and the ambiguity 
of software patent boundaries. The utility requirement for patents is designed 
precisely to prevent rent seeking such as this but fails due to the nature of software 
patents (Merges 2009). PMEs typically do not approach the market when a patent is 
brand new, but rather waits until the technology develops and becomes adopted. 
Notice failure allows for “infringers” to invest in a technology organically for years 
without realizing anything was wrong and then suddenly become ambushed by 
lawsuits or royalty claims. PMEs should also not be confused with patent brokers, 
who buy patents and actively try to grant licenses for its use through advertisements 
and collaboration with industry rivals. A patent broker, while being the middleman, is 
still promoting the diffusion of technology and innovation because they approach the 
market immediately and are transparent about their patents, as opposed to hiding them 
and encouraging notice failure (Penin 2012).   
 
Although not exclusive to PMEs, patent ownership fragmentation, known commonly 
as “patent thickets”, poses a threat to future innovation by raising the barriers of entry 
into certain industries (Galasso & Schankerman 2010). As mentioned in Section 2, a 
smartphone can have over 250,000 patents on a single phone, essentially creating a 
weave or “thicket” of patents that fragment ownership. With so many different patents 
and owners on a single product, transaction costs go up and innovation is slowed 
down in the process of sorting through legal boundaries, ownership, and attaining 
licenses (Bessen & Meurer 2008). Opponents of the idea that patent thickets are a 
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problem in the software industry, such as Campbell-Kelly (2005), argue that the flow 
of new software products has not yet been impeded and entry into the industry is not 
limited only to large firms so therefore patent thickets must not exist or must not be a 
problem. Furthermore Noel and Schankerman (2006) find in their research that patent 
thickets reduce the market value of software companies, but they argue that this 
disadvantage is equally balanced by the fact that software companies can attain their 
own patents. The reality of the matter is that the most extensive patent thickets occur 
in the semiconductor, electronics, telecommunications and computer hardware 
industries despite the fact that they have very little to do with software creation 
(Bessen & Meurer 2008). One study found that only 5% of software patents are held 
by software firms, which suggests that there is more speculative patenting behavior 
going on rather than actual innovation (Bessen & Hunt 2007).   
 
Section 4. Methodology and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1 Present Day USPTO  
Legal gaming of IPR in the patent system is no new phenomenon, as was detailed in 
Section 2. This section aims to utilize descriptive statistics to aid in visualizing the 
dynamics of the IPR environment, particularly in relation to software patents and 
PME litigation and to describe the case study methodology being utilized for 
subsequent analysis. The USPTO has experienced a steady increase in patent 
applications for decades but the last decade in particular has been difficult for the 
USPTO. Despite the hiring of patent examiners at a proportionate rate to the growth 
of patent applications, the USPTO has encountered a growing backlog of patents 
pending approval. It took only 6 years for the total application backlog to double from 
485,000 in the year 2000 to over a million in 2006. In comparison, the previous 
doubling of the backlog from 250,000 took 12 years starting in 1990 (USPTO 2013). 
In 2009, when David Kappos took over as director of the USPTO, he made it clear 
that reduction of the backlog and improving patent quality were the main priorities. 
“A cornerstone of our plan is reducing patent pendency and optimizing patent and 
trademark quality.” (Kappos 2010). Figure 3 shows the logarithmic values of total 
patent applications and total grants per year for the USPTO over the last decade. The 
results of Figure 2 show that the trajectory of patent grants has steepened since around 
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2008/2009, meaning that a higher ratio of patents grants to application has occurred 
therein increasing the grant percentage. There could be a myriad of reasons for this to 
happen, for example a publicized clarification of USPTO prerequisites could improve 
the quality of applications being received and could increase the approval rating. 
Moreover the widespread adoption of electronic filing as opposed to traditional 
handwritten application could indeed improve efficiency and allow examiners to 
assess more patents and consequently approve more patents. Under the same time 
period, the prevalence of PME activity has drastically increased. Figure 4 shows that 
the share of PME litigation activity has nearly tripled from 26% in 2008 to 67% in 
2013. This relationship between growing incidences of PME activity and total patent 
approval ratings has motivated the author to qualitatively investigate individual case 
studies to analyze the quality of some controversial patent cases in recent history.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
With aid from descriptive statistics, the methodology of this article will implement a 
comparative case study design of 4 separate cases. Case studies were chosen due to 
their unique ability to collect detailed data that would be unavailable under other 
research methods (Bryman 2008). Data on patent litigation is often hard to come by. 
Even though court cases are public domain, the vast majority of agreements happen 
before it reaches court and deals are often brokered under non-disclosure agreements 
(Merges 2009). Another benefit of using the case study method is that it can aid 
researchers in adapting ideas and producing novel hypotheses. Statistics from the 
USPTO and RPX Corporation show some interesting trends to consider, but they lack 
enough insight and context to draw any kind of concrete causal linkages.  “The case 
study offers a means of investigating complex social units consisting of multiple 
variables of potential importance in understanding the phenomenon” (Merriam 2009).  
 
Two software patents were chosen (wherein one is a business method patent), one 
high-tech patent was chosen within communications, and one photography patent was 
chosen to illustrate that poor quality patents are not only limited to software and high-
tech industries.  
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Figure	  3	  	  
	  
Figure	  4 
 
The subcategory of this case study methodology would be explanatory, as the aim is 
to explain how the theoretical framework in the previous section is materialized in 
specific cases. The four case studies were chosen to represent examples in the 
different patent classes with high litigation ratios.  
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4.3 Limitations and Biases 
One of the primary criticisms of case study methodology is that it is often not 
generalizable to the wider population. This can lead to an incidence where collected 
data is not relevant or useful (Holliday 2007). This issue is not particularly relevant 
for this study because the aim is not to generalize the findings. Patent litigation 
statistics already supports the idea the patent monetization entities are multiplying and 
their relative share of total patent litigation is growing, currently at 67% in 2013 (RPX 
Corp. 2013). Moreover the case study analysis is not trying to assess a total economic 
impact of such activities extrapolated from the data, but rather to show real life 
examples of how the IPR system can legally be gamed to extract rents without adding 
any kind of novel innovation or how to artificially inflate patent values through 
aggressive legal tactics. It is also worthy to note that case studies lend their credibility 
to the ethics of the author and their own subjective biases. As only one person 
normally conducts the case study, data can be selectively chosen and/or omitted 
unethically as a strategy to strengthen one’s argument (Merriam 2009). This study 
also contains a potential exogenous bias from the second hand patent data supplied by 
RPX Corporation. Due to the fact that RPX is a private, for-profit, company that 
profits on selling licenses to its own pool of patents that are claimed to be of low 
quality, there is a possible conflict of interest for RPX in inflating some of the 
statistics, as it could result in more business for them. Due to a lack of reliable 
alternate patent statistics, a decision was made that RPX statistics are the best 
currently available. Finally, it has been argued that it is very difficult to compose a 
definite cause and effect link from case study analysis (ibid.).  
  
Section 5. Case Studies – 4 Approved USPTO Patents 
 
5.1 Personal Audio US Patent 8,112,504 – Class 707/709 Software 
Personal Audio is suing three of the most popular podcasters, Adam Carolla, 
HowStuffWorks and Togi Entertainment, claiming that Personal Audio owns the 
patent for podcasting. In most cases, the priority date and the filing date are 
interchangeable because the priority date is essentially when the patent goes in effect. 
Since 1995, the duration of a patent is 20 years with the priority date starting when the 
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patent was filed. Before 1995, a patent was granted for 17 years with the priority date 
going into effect after the final approval of the patent. The previous method created an 
environment conducive for submarine patents and the changes in regulation were 
aimed to deter this behavior. The one exception for having a priority date earlier than 
the filing date is when a patent is claimed to be a continuing application by an 
applicant who wishes additional claims to a “parent patent” filed at an earlier date. 
This is exactly the case with Personal Audio; this patent for podcasting was filed in 
March 2009, but claims US Patent 6,199,076 (which claims ownership of the playlist) 
as its parent patent and was filed in October 1996. With the parent patent successfully 
winning a settlement against Apple in 2011, it seems as if Personal Audio is looking 
to capitalize on this by applying for (and subsequently being awarded) the backdated 
priority, essentially transforming it into a submarine patent.  
 
As mentioned in Section 3, submarine patents pose a major threat for honest 
businessmen. Due to non-public applications, notice failure, or intentional secrecy, 
anyone could potentially infringe on a patent unknowingly. Personal Audio’s ability 
to get a priority date in 1996 is the only factor making the lawsuit possible, with both 
Adam Carolla’s and HowStuffWorks’ podcasts starting before the 2009 filing date. 
As a result, prior art must be found to exist before 1996. Nevertheless, the Internet 
was not the first and only way to share files via computer and one of which, named 
Usenet, was set up in 1979 between Duke University and University of North 
Carolina (LaQuey 1990) and could arguably qualify for prior art for the patent, 
proving that it does not fulfill the novelty requirement. Well aware of this, Personal 
Audio cleverly used their 13-year priority gap advantage to tailor their vocabulary 
towards present day’s technology and use certain keywords to exclusively specify 
technology that is used today but is not applicable to previous systems.  
 
each of said one or more media files being stored at a storage location 
specified by a unique episode URL; 
(US Patent 8,112,504) 
 
 
The operative term in that sentence is URL, which could easily be interchanged with 
domain name or web address normally, but URL is a term used exclusively for the 
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internet and did not exist in Usenet, and this careful choice of words could be the 
difference between winning or losing a lawsuit. The ambiguity of boundaries within 
abstract concepts, such as software patents, and their adverse effects on commerce 
and innovation has been sufficiently covered hitherto and further discussion behind 
the reasoning will not be covered, but a small excerpt from Personal Audio’s claimed 
will be quoted as an example of how confusing and unclear it can actually become.  
 
a processor coupled to said digital memory and to said communications port 
for performing a sequence of timed update operations, each of said update 
operations comprising: 
downloading via the Internet the current version of a compilation file 
identified by a predetermined URL and storing said current version of said 
compilation file in said digital memory, said current version of said 
compilation file containing attribute data describing one or more episodes of 
a series of episodes, said attribute data for each given one of said episodes 
including one or more episode URLs identifying one or more corresponding 
media files representing said given one of said episodes, 
        (US Patent 8,112,504) 
 
The defendants of this case are podcasters, people who use podcasting software made 
by someone else, to have their voice heard over the Internet. Cases where PMEs 
target users rather than manufacturers of technology are currently gaining popularity 
in the media, but no legislation has been passed to directly address this issue (Bessen 
& Meurer 2008). The most probable reason for Personal Audio going after podcasters 
is that there are many more podcasters than there are podcast software developers, 
and furthermore the aggregate resources of the broadcasters is clearly larger but more 
disorganized, perfect for extracting licensing fees. Aside from the very top tier of 
podcasting, the majority of podcasters makes no money or operates at a loss, yet all of 
them are subject to royalty demands if the plaintiff prevails. This case is ongoing and 
a decision is yet to be determined.  
 
5.2 Walker Digital US Patent 7,835,950 – Class 705 Software (Business Methods) 
Walker digital, the parent company for priceline.com, has become a notorious PME in 
recent years for suing tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook, 
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just to name a few, over their extensive patent portfolio. In fact, Walker Digital sued 
over 100 of the most successful Internet companies in 2011 alone (Masnick 2011). 
However, Walker Digital is not a non-practicing entity, but in fact has several 
operating companies, making it an atypical PME case. In 2010, Walker Digital was 
granted a business method patent on “a method and apparatus for product display.” 
The method is summarized in the abstract section of the patent application as: De 
 
Systems and methods are provided for receiving from a customer a selection 
of a product category.  At least one product is determined that is associated 
with the selected product category. A substitute product for the determined 
product is selected. In one embodiment, a signal is transmitted to display the 
selected substitute product  
(US Patent 7,835,950) 
 
The innovative business method that this patent is claiming to embody is essentially 
the idea of sorting a product inquiry by keyword. If one were looking to buy a 
hammer at a retail home improvement store, it is safe to assume that all of the 
hammers would be located in a categorized location designated for hammers. It would 
make little sense for a store owner to separate products in any other fashion, for 
example by price or by make, unless it was subcategorized within the hammer 
department. The reason for this is when one wants to buy a product, it is not often 
known exactly which brand or exactly what price the item will cost, and therefore it is 
beneficial as a consumer to have products categorized by type in order to compare 
and contrast their characteristics, prices, etc. Walker Digital has seemingly taken this 
centuries old concept and patented it as an innovative business method, which is 
possible because it has been implemented through software. The first two paragraphs 
under the heading “Detailed Description of the Invention” is noted as follows:  
 
Applicants have recognized that, in some situations, it can be advantageous to 
display products to customers who may be willing to purchase those products. 
     
	   26	  
Applicants have also recognized that, in some situations, it can be 
advantageous to display products to customers in exchange for money 
received from a seller of that product, such as a manufacturer or wholesaler. 
 (US Patent 7,835,950) 
The description above entails the basic business method of virtually all retail stores in 
recent history, the only differentiating factor is that the transaction is made over the 
Internet with the aid of computer software. Cases such as this are a prime example of 
why other regional patent offices besides the USPTO, such as the European Patent 
Office, are resistant to allowing business methods to be patented (Harrison 2012). 
This patent allows Walker Digital to essentially sue any online retailer that uses 
keywords to search for and to suggest related products to the consumer. Considering 
the patent was approved in 2010 and the level of patent assertion committed by 
Walker Digital in 2011, the data may speak for itself in regards to its contribution to 
uncertainty in the online retail market. This patent speaks for the level of 
interpretation allowed on the non-obviousness requirement in the business method 
patent class. 
 
 
5.3 Innovatio IP Ventures - 23 Patents - Class 370 Multiplex Communications 
After over 2 decades of changing hands, a group of 23 patents deemed essential for  
Wi-Fi (or WLAN) arrived at an emerging PME named Innovatio IP Ventures. Once 
the patents were acquired, Innovatio sent thousands of letters targeting hotels, 
restaurants, and coffee shops that transmit free Wi-Fi to its customers. The monetary 
amount of royalties claimed by Innovatio ranged between $2300-$5000 (Nazer 2014). 
It is hard for anyone to argue that Wi-Fi is a significant innovation, bordering on a 
disruptive innovation. However, even if it is assumed that these patents are of 
sufficient quality and Innovatio is therefore legally entitled to royalties, the monetary 
value assigned to the royalties does not reflect the real economic value but rather 
reflects a value less than the cost of legal defense for the defendants. Litigation 
brought forth by Innovatio for this patent group is a textbook example of the nuisance 
suit economic model in practice. Due to the fact that it would be difficult to set up 
even the first appointment with a defense lawyer for less than 3000 dollars and there 
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are no shortage of hotels and cafés offering free Wi-Fi, the business model of 
Innovatio was to extract the maximum amount of money that would still discourage a 
defense and then scale it to as many businesses as possible. In an interview made on 
ipwatchdog.com, Innovatio’s lawyer justified their price level by arguing that 
Innovatio attempted to strike a licensing deal with a hotel chain for 2 million dollars, 
but the hotel responded by saying that the chain was owned by 500 separate franchise 
owners so the cost should be split evenly. Therefore, Innovatio divided 2 million by 
500 and sent out 500 licensing demands to the hotels and cafés and decided to keep 
the same pricing methodology for its other claims (Niro 2012).  
 
Three of the largest wireless router manufacturers, Cisco, Netgear and Motorola, 
intervened in the litigation after word of Innovatio’s actions became public news. This 
was, however, after Innovatio had sent out more than 13,000 letters requesting 
licensing fees for off-the-shelf routers bought in retail stores (Mullin 2014). Many of 
the routers owned by the recipients of licensing letters had already been licensed by 
the manufacturer of the router in previous agreements with Innovatio. Defendants 
were not made aware that some routers under certain manufacturers had already been 
licensed, prompting multiple licenses being pursued for the same router. This type of 
activity is known as patent exhaustion and is illegal (Kamdar 2013). Out of the 185 
million wireless routers produced by Cisco, 100 million had already been licensed by 
the time the licensing request letters were being sent out, proving that the issue of 
patent exhaustion is not a minor one in this case. After accruing 13 million dollars in 
lawyer fees, Cisco reached a settlement with Innovatio to license their remaining 85 
million routers for 3.2 cents each totalling 2.7 million dollars or 0.0000106% of their 
initial offer to end users per unit. To further illustrate the magnitude of Innovatio’s 
initial royalty claims, if Cisco were to license all their routers at $3000 each, the total 
would come to 550 billion dollars, and that is only for 1 router manufacturer. Due to 
the FRAND commitments, a judge ruled that Innovatio’s claim to royalties was worth 
9.56 cents per unit for the remaining non-licensed routers from other companies 
(Mullin 2014). Despite the fact that its quite obvious that Innovatio would not have 
asserted the initial 3000-dollar royalty claim against all routers, the inherent problem 
lies in the potential of them being able to do so. While a fair settlement was ultimately 
reached, it came at the cost of 13 million dollars to Cisco in unnecessary litigation 
fees and the exorbitantly inflated licensing fees already paid by the hoteliers and café 
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owners. If not for the support of the router manufacturers, how long would it have 
taken for a small business owner to build a 13 million dollar defense over a 3000-
dollar dispute? 
5.4 Amazon.com US Patent 8,676,045 – Class 396 Photography 
In November 2011, Amazon.com applied for a patent on the specifics of a standard 
photography studio setup. The patent description is essentially describing the optimal 
photo studio arrangement that one would be taught in an introduction to photography 
course (Kuruvilla 2014). There are several reasons for choosing this particular case to 
discuss: firstly, this is a photography patent and this example serves to show that the 
issue of abstract boundaries is not limited to software patents, even in contemporary 
times. Secondly it seems interesting to inquire as to why Amazon decided to pursue 
this patent- is it for asserting or for defensive purposes? Lastly, this patent serves as 
tangible evidence as to the quality level of at least some of the patents being approved 
through the USPTO.  
 
This patent reduced from the technical jargon amounts to 4 lights, a curved white 
background, a podium, and a camera with the innovation being in the arrangement of 
the aforementioned items for the purpose of creating the illusion of a seamless white 
background. According to the application, the first 4 out of the 27 claims on the patent 
are as follows,  
 
(1) a background comprising a white cyclorama; 
(2) a front light source positioned in a longitudinal axis intersecting the 
background, the longitudinal axis further being substantially perpendicular to 
a surface of the white cyclorama; 
(3) an image capture position located between the background and the front 
light source in the longitudinal axis, the image capture position comprising at 
least one image capture device equipped with an eighty-five millimeter lens, 
the at least one image capture device further configured with an ISO setting of 
about three hundred twenty and an f-stop value of about 5.6; 
(4) an elevated platform positioned between the image capture position and 
the background in the longitudinal axis, the front light source being directed 
toward a subject on the elevated platform; 
        (US Patent 8,676,045) 
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The latter description is a more technical narrative than the former, yet the substance 
and innovativeness of both are equivalent. According to Amazon the innovation lies 
in the ability to take photos (or video) seamlessly against a white backdrop without 
the need for post-production editing. If this technique had been brand new, the 
argument for innovation would be much stronger because there does indeed exist a 
degree of utility. Using this reasoning, the issue therein must lie with discovery failure 
of prior art. A quick Google search shows this photography method as being used as 
early as 1974 by Tony Frontera, long before personal computers were used for digital 
image editing, so techniques such as the one described in the patent were necessary in 
order to achieve a seamless photo or video (Russel 2005). In defense of the patent 
examiner, if one is not a photographer or familiar with studio arrangements, it could 
be easy to make this mistake without a having a systematic way of searching for prior 
art. However, regardless of ones photographical knowledge, uncertainty over such an 
issue should be forwarded to a specialist within photography in this case, who could 
then enlighten the examiner in order to make an educated decision.  
 
Finally, the question of Amazon’s motives is an interesting one; albeit the answer 
remains unsettling regardless of if their intentions are assertion or defensive. While 
aggressive patent litigation is the hallmark of PMEs, a White House report on patent 
assertion informs that some practicing firms are realizing the economic potential of 
such tactics and have started utilizing them (White House 2013). Amazon is the 
largest online retail store and is no stranger to patent litigation, and the nature of 
online commerce requires that Amazon photographs their merchandise against a 
neutral background and this patent could very well be a preemptive defensive 
measure. The logic is simple; if Amazon can be granted a patent like this then so 
could their competition or any PME that could therein assert the patent against 
Amazon. Amazon has been listed as being the third largest defendant in PME lawsuits 
with 36 new cases in 2012, fewer only to Apple and Samsung (RPX Corp. 2012). If 
Amazon’s intentions are purely defensive, it is hard to condemn their actions and this 
example serves as proof of the additional social “tax” placed on business for operating 
business as usual. Nevertheless, the patent was granted on March 18, 2014. 
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Section 6. Conclusion 
This article’s purpose is to explore some ways that PMEs are contributing to the 
increase in litigation and legal uncertainty in the current institutional environment of 
IPRs in the United States. A brief exploration of the history of the patent system in the 
United States has been provided to give a more thorough understanding of the modern 
IPR system. The current IPR environment was described only in enough detail to give 
context to the arguments provided. Not all patents are equally susceptible to 
ownership disputes because different patent classes have varying degrees of clarity in 
the boundaries of patent protection. As software patenting is still a relatively new 
phenomenon, conflicts in the location of prior art have risen. This has led to cases of 
unintentional patent infringement and notice failure. Furthermore the lack of concrete 
boundaries in abstract concepts allows for the possibility of misinterpretation. This 
unpredictability can be leveraged by PMEs to extract licensing fees from alleged 
infringers. Consequently, the increased aggregation of patents for both offensive and 
defensive strategies creates a reinforcing cycle that perpetuates market uncertainty. 
Through the use of descriptive statistics and case studies, it has been shown that the 
patenting process and judiciary resolutions are skewed in favor of PMEs, contributing 
to the increase of patent litigation. The ensuing uncertainty creates a disincentive for 
investment and raises barriers for market entry.  
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